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I. Introduction 
Are federal regulatory laws that are completely silent about their 
applicability to Indian nations nevertheless applicable to such nations inside 
Indian reservations? There are many such laws: The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA),1 the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA),2 the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),3 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment act (ADEA),4 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),5 
and even the Affordable Care Act.6 With the development of Indian gaming 
and the diversification of tribal economies bringing about a proliferation of 
tribally owned corporations, whether such laws are applicable to tribally 
                                                                                                     
 1. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).  
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012).  
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).  
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 18081 (2012). See Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Burwell, 118 F. Supp. 
3d 1264, 1281 (D. Wyo. 2015) (treating tribal employers as “large employers” under section 
18081(f)(2)(A) because Indian tribes were not specifically excluded from the definition). 
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owned businesses is an increasingly frequently asked and litigated question. 
In all of these laws, Indian nations are not mentioned in the text of the 
statute or in the legislative history. The question, therefore, is whether to 
interpret this congressional silence as including or excluding tribal 
organizations from the laws’ coverage. 
Indian nations have been recognized as having the inherent 
sovereignty to exercise a number of governmental powers over their 
reservations.7 Because in many cases, application of such federal regulatory 
laws would interfere with tribal sovereignty, a decision to apply these laws 
to Indian nations inside reservations is a question that goes to the essence of 
how federal courts should view tribal sovereignty.8 Yet, even though the 
Supreme Court has issued many opinions concerning the extent of tribal 
sovereignty, especially as it relates to tribal jurisdiction over non-members,9 
or the application of state laws inside Indian reservations,10 it has never 
directly addressed this particular issue.11  
Faced with this congressional and Supreme Court silence, the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals have, since the early 1980s, developed at least 
four principal approaches in interpreting this congressional silence. Most 
circuits today are following an approach first developed in 1980 by the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Farris.12 This approach is now known as 
the Coeur d’Alene approach from the first case that applied a general 
federal regulatory law to a tribally owned enterprise.13 Under this approach, 
                                                                                                     
 7. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1981). 
 8. This Article will generally refer to “Indian nations” and “Indian tribes” 
interchangeably. Although the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution refers to 
Congress having the power to regulate Commerce with Indian “tribes,” many treaties were 
subsequently signed between the United States and Indian “nations.” 
 9. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and 
Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  
 10. See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Braker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), 
California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 
U.S. 163 (1989). 
 11. There are currently, however, two petitions for certiorari, both filed on February 
12th 2016, pending in front of the Supreme Court: NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 
2015). 
 12. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 13. Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). In Farris, 
it was the application of a criminal law, the Organized Crime Control Act, to individual 
Indians owning a casino on the reservation. In Coeur d’Alene, it was the applicability of 
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the legislative silence is interpreted as creating a presumption that the 
federal regulatory law applies to Indian tribes but allows the presumption to 
be rebutted if application of the federal law would interfere with purely 
intramural aspects of tribal self-governance, or with a right reserved by the 
tribe in a treaty.14 If the treaty or tribal self-governance exceptions apply, 
courts have required clear evidence of congressional intent to apply the law 
to the tribes. The Coeur d’Alene approach has been followed in the 
Second,15 Sixth,16 Seventh,17 and Eleventh Circuits.18 
A second approach was more recently developed by the D.C. Circuit 
in San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB.19 This approach could be called the 
“Spectrum of Sovereignty” approach because under it, the general federal 
law will more likely not be applied to Indian nations if such application 
would interfere with more “traditional” aspects of tribal self-government 
but will be applied if it tends to interfere only with more “commercial” 
aspects of tribal self-government such as, for instance, the operation of a 
tribal casino. 
Unlike both of these approaches which determine applicability of the 
federal law based on what kind of tribal sovereign powers are being 
interfered with, a Sixth Circuit panel recently decided the issue by putting 
the burden on the Indian nations to show that they had enough sovereignty 
left to preempt the federal law.20 After stating that Indian tribes retained all 
their original sovereign powers unless such powers have been taken away 
by Congress, given up in treaties, or were lost through implicit divestiture 
                                                                                                     
OSHA to a tribally owned enterprise. 
 14. 624 F.2d 890, at 893–94. The court also mentioned that the presumption could also 
be rebutted if it could be proven by other evidence that Congress did not intend the law to 
apply. There seems to be no cases that have ever applied this third exception in order to 
rebut the presumption of applicability. It would seem that the presumption could be rebutted 
either by legislative history, some kind of structural analysis of the statute, or some historical 
understanding that tribes were to be exempted from application of the law. 
 15. Mashantucket Sand and Gravel v. Reich, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 16. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), 
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1024).  
 17. See generally Smart v. State Farm Insurance, 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 18. See generally Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126 (11th 
Cir. 1999).  
 19. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 20. See Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. 
filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1034) (acknowledging that a previous panel in a different 
case, NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), had 
adopted the Coeur d’Alene approach, however, petition for certiorari in that case was also 
filed February 12, 2016).  
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as a result of their status as domestic dependent nations, the panel took into 
consideration the evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence on the extent of 
retained tribal sovereignty over individuals who are not tribal members. 
Because the panel adopted the concept of implicit divestiture as set forth in 
the leading case, Montana v. United States,21 I will refer to this approach as 
the “Montana framework” approach. 
A fourth approach developed by the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Pueblo 
of San Juan,22 adopted the opposite take on who has the burden to show 
preemption. Instead of asking whether the tribes have enough sovereignty 
to preempt the federal law, the court viewed the central question as whether 
Congress in enacting the NLRA had the intent to preempt Indian tribes 
from enacting right-to-work laws which may conflict with the NLRA 
requirements. Because the Pueblo of San Juan court also found that “in 
addition to broad authority over intramural maters such as membership, 
tribes retain sovereign authority to regulate economic activity within their 
own territory,”23 it concluded that “[p]reempting tribal laws divests tribes of 
their retained sovereign authority . . . In the absence of clear evidence of 
congressional intent, therefore, federal law will not be read as stripping 
tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass right-to-work laws and be 
governed by them.”24 Unlike the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits, therefore, the 
Tenth Circuit considered congressional “silence” as creating a presumption 
of non-applicability. Furthermore, unlike the approaches developed in the 
other circuits, instead of focusing on what kind of tribal sovereign powers 
are being interfered with, the Tenth Circuit asked the more appropriate and 
relevant question which is what indicia of legislative intent should courts 
demand of Congress before tribal sovereignty can be abrogated. 
This Article takes the position that the meaning of congressional 
silence concerning application of these federal laws to Indian nations 
should be determined using a theory of statutory interpretation called 
“practical reasoning” which is a methodology first developed by Professors 
Philip Frickey and William Eskridge.25 In their seminal work, Professors 
Frickey and Eskridge criticized the courts’ exclusive reliance on what they 
call “foundational” theories of statutory interpretation. These are theories 
                                                                                                     
 21. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 22. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 23. Id. at 1192–93.  
 24. Id. at 1195. 
 25. William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter “Practical Reasoning”].  
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that propose a unitary foundation for statutory interpretation. The three 
main ones being “intentionalism,” “purposivism,” and “textualism.” 
Frickey and Eskridge argued that “[e]ach of the three grand theories seeks 
to reconcile statutory interpretation by unelected judges with the 
assumptions of majoritarian political theory.”26 Judges do this because they 
are concerned that their own interpretations will be criticized as being the 
product of raw political preferences and therefore illegitimate.  
Although judges may claim they rely on only one of the 
foundationalist theories, practical reasoning suggests that in many cases, 
judges rely not only on all three foundationalist theories when interpreting 
statutes, but also add a good dose of practical or pragmatic reasoning in 
making their decisions. Thus, “practical reasoning” starts first with textual 
considerations (textualism),27 moves next to historical considerations to 
understand the original legislative expectations (a mix of intentionalism and 
purposivism),28 before ending with what the authors call “evolutive 
considerations.”29 This last step starts with considering how implementation 
of the statute has changed over time, and ends with an appraisal of how any 
proposed interpretation would fit with constitutional values, current 
congressional policies, and general ideas of fairness.30 “Practical reasoning” 
is therefore both descriptive and prescriptive. It not only describes what 
judges actually do when interpreting statutes but also provides normative 
justifications for why interpretations reached through that method are 
legitimate. According to Eskridge and Frickey, “practical reasoning,” 
“means an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture 
of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common 
law), seeking contextual justification for the best legal answer among the 
potential alternatives.”31 
“Practical reasoning” is especially well suited to determining the issue 
of applicability of federal laws to Indian nations because in the cases 
referred above, the circuits are not focusing on statutory meaning or 
congressional intent but on how to interpret congressional silence. 
“Practical reasoning” is also appropriate here because as once argued by 
Professor Frickey, when it comes to statutory interpretation in Federal 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 325.  
 27. Id. at 354.  
 28. Id. at 356. 
 29. Id. at 358. 
 30. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 359.  
 31. Id. at 322 n.3.  
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Indian law, the Supreme Court is making its decisions largely along 
pragmatic considerations based on contextual and historical realities.32 
In order to make these points, Part II sets forth and evaluates the 
various methodologies adopted by the circuits in determining whether to 
apply general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations. Part III applies 
“practical reasoning” methodology to this problem. After examining the 
contextual background of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law through 
analysis of relevant Supreme Court precedents, the Article evaluates 
various practical considerations as well as current congressional policies, 
before concluding that the approaches developed by the Tenth Circuit in 
Pueblo of San Juan and in a Seventh Circuit opinion authored by Judge 
Posner,33 are more consistent with Supreme Court precedents as well as 
with “practical reasoning.”34  
                                                                                                     
 32. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the 
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law. 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1234 (1990) (“The cases 
approach the problems with respect for tradition of Indian sovereignty, avoid adopting 
formal concepts that sweep away potential contextual concerns, and ultimately place the 
dispute where the best case for tribal sovereignty can develop, in a case-by-case, contextual 
manner consistent with Indian tradition and contemporary circumstances.”) [hereinafter 
Congressional Intent]. Professor Frickey based this observation on cases such as Solemn v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v. 
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206 (1983); 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). In later writings, Professor Frickey 
noted that in its latest federal Indian law decisions, the Court was “jerry-rigging a ruthlessly 
pragmatic blend of federal Indian law with general American law.” Philip P. Frickey, 
(Native) American Law Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 460 
(2005). 
 33. See generally Reich v. Great Lake Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
 34. Although the position adopted in this Article may allow Indian tribes to more 
readily avoid the application of general federal regulatory laws, this should not be an 
indication that, politically speaking, I am against laws imposing regulations protecting 
workers in the workplace or allowing these workers to unionize. In this fashion, I am 
sympathetic to the views of those scholars who have encouraged tribes to enact regulations 
protecting workers in a tribal environment. See generally Jonathan Guss, Gaming 
Sovereignty? A Plea for Protecting Workers Rights While Preserving Sovereignty, 102 
CALIF L. REV. 1623 (2014); DAVID KEMPER, THE WORK OF SOVEREIGNTY: TRIBAL LABOR 
RELATIONS AND SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE NAVAJO NATION (2010). 
130 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123 (2016) 
II. Interpreting Silence in the Circuits 
A. Silence as a Presumption of Applicability 
1. The Ninth Circuit “Intramural Aspects” Approach. 
The issue in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene was the application of OSHA 
to the Coeur d’Alene tribal farm. The Ninth Circuit’s approach starts with a 
presumption that the law applies to tribes. That presumption is derived from 
dicta in a Supreme Court case to the effect that it was “now well settled by 
many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying all 
persons include Indians and their property interests.”35 That presumption in 
turn can be rebutted if: “(1) the law touches ‘exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters, (2) the application of the law to 
the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties, or (3) there is 
proof by legislative or some other means that Congress intended the law not 
to apply to Indians on their reservations.”36 
Having enunciated its legal principle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the operation of a farm that sells produce on the open market and in 
interstate commerce should be covered under OSHA . “Because the Farm 
employs non-Indians . . . and because it is in virtually every respect a 
normal commercial farming enterprise, we believe that its operation free of 
federal health and safety regulations is “neither profoundly intramural nor 
essential to self-government.”37 
The Ninth Circuit decision to apply OSHA to tribal commercial 
enterprises was followed by the Seventh Circuit,38 as well as the Second 
Circuit.39 In addition to OSHA, commercial enterprises on Indian 
reservations also have to abide by the FLSA.40 Similarly, tribal health 
centers have been held to be covered under ERISA.41 In another case, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that under the Coeur D’Alene approach, a tribally 
owned restaurant and entertainment facility was subject to the ADA.42 
                                                                                                     
 35. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).  
 36. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 37. Id.  
 38. See generally Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
 39. See generally Reich v. Mashantucket Sand and Gravel, 95 F.3d (2d Cir. 1996).  
 40. See generally Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 41. See generally Smart v. State Farm, 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).  
 42. Florid Paraplegic Ass. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1126 (11th Cir. 1999).  
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However, the Eleventh Circuit in that case also found that the tribe could 
not be sued because the ADA had not waived sovereign immunity.43 
Finally the Sixth Circuit recently used the “intramural aspect” approach to 
hold that the NLRA was applicable to a tribally owned casino.44 
Coeur d’Alene’s “intramural aspect” approach adopts a very restrictive 
and narrow view of tribal sovereignty. Under that approach, federal 
regulatory laws will almost always be found applicable to the tribes. There 
are, however, a few exceptions. Thus, the ADEA was found not applicable 
to a dispute between a Tribal Housing Authority and one of its employees 
who was a member of that tribe.45 There is also one district court decision 
within the Ninth Circuit that did not follow the Seventh Circuit decision in 
Smart v. State Farm,46 and refused to apply ERISA to a tribally owned 
lumber mill.47 Furthermore, the FLSA was found not applicable to the 
operations of the Navajo Nation’s Division of Public Safety, an agency in 
charge of law enforcement within the Navajo reservation.48 
2. Evaluating the “Intramural Aspects” Approach. 
Because the “purely intramural” approach has already been 
overwhelmingly criticized by scholars,49 I am going to briefly summarize 
here the main arguments against the doctrine. The major problem with the 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 1131–34. This decision nicely highlights the irrational difference in 
treatment between abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity which under Supreme Court 
precedents, requires clear evidence of congressional intent, and abrogation of other tribal 
sovereign rights not specifically retained in a treaty which under Coeur d’Alene, require 
clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate only if they can be considered to involve 
“strictly intramural aspects” of tribal sovereignty. Why the different treatment?  
 44. NLRB v. Little River Band, 788 F.3d 537, 548 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 45. See generally EEOC v. Karuk Tribe, 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Lumber 
Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prod. Indus., 730 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Cal. 
1990).  
 46. Smart v. State Farm, 868 F. 2d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 1989).  
 47. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund. 730 F. Supp. at 324 (E.D. Cal. 1990).  
 48. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir 2004). 
 49. Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native 
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency. 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 
(1994); Kaighn Smith Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint: The Problem of 
Labor and Employment Relations within the Reservation, 2008 MICH. S. L. REV. 505, 538–
42 (2008), Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
691, 702–07 (2004), see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of 
General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 
(1991). 
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doctrine is that the Coeur d’Alene court relied on a Supreme Court case, 
FPC v. Tuscarora,50 which did not hold that federal regulatory laws that do 
not mention Indians are presumptively applicable to Indian tribes inside 
their reservations. In Tuscarora, the Federal Power Commission (FPA) was 
trying to condemn land owned in fee by the Tuscarora Indian Nation Act 
for a flood control project. The FPA exempted Indian reservations and the 
crucial issue was whether the land in question, which was owned in fee by 
the tribe, could be considered an Indian reservation under the Act and thus 
exempted from condemnation. The FPA was not, therefore, a federal law of 
general applicability not mentioning Indians or Indian tribes. The Court 
held that these tribal fee lands were not a “reservation” under the FPA.51 
The Tuscarora tribe also argued that even if its fee land could not be 
considered part of the reservation, it was exempted from the FPA under the 
doctrine of Elk v. Wilkens.52 In Elk, the Court held that an Indian born on an 
Indian reservation did not become a United States citizen pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, “[u]nder 
the constitution as originally established . . . General acts of congress did 
not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention 
to include them.”53 It is to answer this argument that the Court stated its 
now famous dicta that “it is now well settled by many decisions of this 
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians 
and their property interests.”54 So, at most, the Tuscarora dicta was directed 
at “Indians and their property” outside Indian reservations.55 
Besides relying on Farris, the Coeur d’Alene Court cited tax cases,56 
another case which, like Farris, applied federal criminal laws to individual 
                                                                                                     
 50. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 111 (1960).  
 51. Id. at 142. That finding was controversial and probably erroneous, Justice Black’s 
dissenting opinion ended by stating “I regret that this Court is to be the governmental agency 
that breaks faith with this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their 
word.” 
 52. See generally Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 53. Id. at 116.  
 54. See id. (citing cases involving federal taxation of individual Indians for its general 
rule, Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm’r, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. Burnet 283 U.S. 691 
(1931); Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)). 
 55. The Tenth Circuit has similarly distinguished Tuscarora as only applying to 
“Indians and their property” but not to situation where the tribe was exercising its sovereign 
governmental power. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
 56. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Kurtz 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982); Fry 
v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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Indians,57 and one case, United States v. Fryberg, which held that the Eagle 
Protection Act abrogated the hunting treaty rights of Indian tribes.58 To the 
extent that Fryberg is interpreted as allowing abrogation of treaty rights 
without clear evidence of congressional intent, it is no longer good law.59 
The only case cited in Coeur d’Alene which was remotely relevant to the 
application of general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations was Navajo 
Tribe v. NLRB.60 This appears to have been the very first case which cited 
Tuscarora for the proposition that general federal laws could be applicable 
inside Indian reservations even if such laws never mentioned Indians. 
However, in this case, the NLRA was being applied to a non-Indian owned 
mining corporation, not to a tribally owned one.61 
A second criticism is that the limits on rights of tribal self-governance 
to “purely intramural” aspects is not based on any relevant Supreme Court 
precedents. As stated earlier, the Coeur d’Alene court relied on United 
States v. Farris for its “purely intramural aspect” restriction on tribal self-
government.62 Farris cited Santa Clara for its “intramural” phraseology. In 
Santa Clara, after stating, “Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of local self-
government. Although no longer ‘possessed of the full attributes of 
sovereignty,’ they remain a ‘separate people, with the power of regulating 
their internal and social relations,’”63 the Supreme Court pointed to such 
                                                                                                     
 57. United States v. Burn 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 58. United States v. Fryburg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 59. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986); but see Fryberg, 622 F.2d at 
1016  
Even though there was no express statement on the “face of the Act” or in the 
legislative history that Congress intended to abrogate or modify Indian treaty 
hunting rights, we are convinced that it is clear from the “surrounding 
circumstances” and “legislative history”, including the broad purpose of the Act 
to protect the bald eagle and prevent its extinction, that Congress intended to 
modify Indian treaty rights to prohibit the taking of bald eagles. 
 60. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
 61. See id.at 165  
Here, the Act clearly applies to the Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation, the 
employer-intervenor, because it is engaged in the production of goods for 
interstate commerce, and labor disputes in its plant would clearly ‘affect 
commerce’ within the meaning of the Act. The circumstance that the 
Corporation's plant is located on the Navajo Reservation cannot remove it or its 
employees—be they Indians or not—from the coverage of the Act.  
 62. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (citing United States 
624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980)).  
 63. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citations omitted).  
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areas as tribal control of membership, domestic relations, and inheritance, 
as examples of tribal governing powers.64 This list was obviously not meant 
to be all inclusive. As explained in the next few paragraphs, this is evident 
from the Court’s reliance on Williams v. Lee at the end of that sentence.65  
After stating that tribal sovereignty was limited to purely intramural 
aspects, the court quoted from Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle for the 
proposition that,  
[o]ver the years this original concept of tribal sovereignty has been 
modified to permit application of state law to reservation Indians in 
matters not considered essential to tribal self-government, but the basic 
principle that the Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction over essential 
matters of reservation government, in the absence of specific 
Congressional limitation, has remained.66 
As the language indicates, “essential matters” of tribal self-government is 
clearly not the same as “purely intramural matters.” Interestingly, the Ninth 
Circuit in Arizona ex. rel Merrill had also relied on Williams v. Lee for its 
statement.67 
Williams is the landmark decision where the Court held that a non-
Indian trader could not sue a Navajo Indian in state court to recover a debt 
the Navajo had incurred on the reservation. The Court there famously 
stated,  
Over the years this Court has modified these principles [denying state 
jurisdiction] in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved 
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic 
policy of Worcester has remained . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts 
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action 
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and 
be ruled by them.68  
It is clear that the matter in Williams v. Lee was not a “purely intramural” 
one as it involved a dispute between a tribal member and a non-Indian. Yet 
the Court held that essential tribal relations were involved because,  
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction 
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation 
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 55–56.  
 65. Id. at 56 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). 
 66. Arizona ex rel. Edgar Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 67. Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)). 
 68. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
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themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on 
the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The 
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian 
governments over their reservations.69 
3. The D.C. Circuit “Spectrum of Sovereignty” Approach. 
In San Manuel Indian Bingo v. NLRB,70 the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
Board’s decision to assume jurisdiction over labor relations within a tribally 
owned casino on an Indian reservation. The court acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court had delineated principles which were “superficially at least, 
in conflict.”71 On one side, there was the Tuscarora dictum, which the court 
interpreted as presuming applicability of the federal regulations unless the 
law interfered with purely intramural aspects of self-governance. On the 
other were the canons of statutory interpretation according to which 
“(1) ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians, 
and (2) a clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a 
court may construe a federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty.”72 
After finding that the first canon was not applicable when a statute was not 
enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians, the San Manuel court stated 
that it did not have to choose between the second canon, also known as the 
Santa Clara principle, and the Tuscarora principle because “we can 
reconcile this principle with Tuscarora by recognizing that, in some cases 
at least, a statute of general application can constrain the actions of a tribal 
government without at the same time impairing tribal sovereignty.”73 The 
court reached that conclusion by adopting what could be called a “spectrum 
of sovereignty” approach where core tribal sovereignty centers on the 
tribe’s exercise of “traditional” governmental functions affecting tribal 
members on tribal lands while the peripheral areas of tribal sovereignty 
extends to the regulation of tribal commercial activities extending beyond 
the reservations and involving non-members either as customers or 
employees.74 The court stated  
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 223.  
 70. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  
 71. Id. at 1311. 
 72. Id. at 1312. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See id. at 1312–13  
An examination of Supreme Court cases shows tribal sovereignty to be at its 
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In sum, the Supreme court decisions reflects an earnest concern for 
maintaining tribal sovereignty, but they also recognize that tribal 
governments engage in a varied range of activities many of which are 
not activities we normally associate with governance. These activities 
include . . . commercial enterprises that tend to blur any distinction 
between the tribal government and a private corporation.75  
Although the Court acknowledged that application of the NLRA may 
infringe on tribal sovereignty in some circumstances, this was not the case 
here as the court concluded that “impairment of tribal sovereignty is 
negligible in this context, as the tribe’s activity was primarily commercial 
and its enactment of labor legislation and its execution of a gaming compact 
were ancillary to that commercial activity.”76 The court also noted that the 
operation of a casino was not a traditional governmental function and that 
the vast majority of employees and customers were non-tribal members not 
living on the reservation.77 
In the last part of the San Manuel decision, the court discussed 
whether the term “employer” under the NLRA included Indian tribal 
governments operating commercial enterprises.78 Relying on decisions by 
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits,79 the Pueblo had made the argument that 
because the NLRA had exempted from its application “any wholly owned 
government corporation . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof,”80 
tribally owned corporations should also be excluded.81 Finding no 
indication of congressional intent whatsoever, the court applied Chevron 
deference to the agency’s decision to include tribal commercial enterprises 
                                                                                                     
strongest when explicitly established by a treaty, or when a tribal government 
acts within the borders of its reservation, in a matter of concern only to members 
of the tribe. Examples of such intramural matters include regulating the status of 
tribe members in relation to one another, and determining tribe membership. 
Conversely, when a tribal government goes beyond matters of internal self-
governance and enters into off-reservation business transaction with non-
Indians, its claim of sovereignty is at its weakest. 
 75. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 76. Id. at 1315. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993); NLRB v. 
Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).  
 81. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  
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as “employers” under the Act. 82 Under Chevron, if a statutory term is 
ambiguous and Congress has delegated the power to make binding 
interpretations to the agency, a court will uphold the agency’s interpretation 
as long as it is permissible or reasonable.83 After acknowledging that the 
tribe’s argument is “certainly plausible,” the court held that, nevertheless, it 
could not say that the Board’s interpretation decision was not a permissible 
construction of the statute.84 The use of Chevron deference in Part III.B. of 
the opinion is surprising since earlier in the opinion, in Part III.A., the court 
had stated, “[b]ecause the Board’s expertise and delegated authority does 
not relate to federal Indian law, we need not defer to the Board’s 
conclusion. Therefore we decide de novo the implications of tribal 
sovereignty on the statutory construction question before us.”85 As some 
other scholars have noted, the two parts of Part III cannot be reconciled 
with each other.86  
4. Evaluating the “Spectrum of Sovereignty” Approach. 
In addition to also erroneously relying on Tuscarora, a major criticism 
of the San Manuel approach is that the distinguishing between tribal 
sovereign powers on a traditional-commercial spectrum conflicts with the 
spirit, if not the holding, of many recent Supreme Court opinions.87 There 
are no Supreme Court precedents mandating different treatment for 
“traditional” instead of “commercial” activities when it comes to the 
exercise of tribal sovereign powers. In effect, quite the opposite is true. In 
refusing Michigan’s argument to overturn or modify Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing Technology,88 and deny the Tribe sovereign immunity when 
operating a commercial gaming establishment, the Supreme Court in its 
recent Bay Mills decision stated that in Kiowa Tribe, 
                                                                                                     
 82. Id. at 1316 (referring to Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  
 83. 467 U.S. 837, 843. 
 84. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.2d at 1316–17.  
 85. Id. at 1312.  
 86. Vicki J. Limas, The Tuscarorganization of the Tribal Workforce, 2008 MICH. 
STATE L. REV. 467, 472–76 (2008); Brian H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian 
Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 474–511 (2007).  
 87. For some insightful critical analysis, see Limas, supra note 86; Wildenthal, supra 
note 86. 
 88. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Ind. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).  
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[i]n rejecting the identical argument Michigan makes, our decision 
reaffirmed a long line of precedents, concluding that “the doctrine of 
tribal immunity”—without any exceptions for commercial or off-
reservation conduct—“is settled law and controls this case.”89 Second, 
we have relied on Kiowa subsequently: In another case involving a 
tribe's off-reservation commercial conduct, we began our analysis with 
Kiowa’s holding that tribal immunity applies to such activity (and then 
found that the Tribe had waived its protection).90 
The Bay Mills Court ended its discussion by reiterating that the 
arguments for limiting tribal sovereignty in the area of commercial 
activities had all been made in Kiowa Tribe, and faced with these 
arguments “[t]he decision could not have been any clearer: ‘We decline to 
draw [any] distinction’ that would ‘confine [immunity] to reservations or to 
noncommercial activities.’”91 The Bay Mills and Kiowa Tribe decisions are 
undoubtedly correct in affording the same kind of protection to traditional 
and commercial governmental activities. The implication that tribal 
involvement into commercial activities somehow deserves less protection 
than “traditional” governmental functions is especially troublesome since, 
as pointed out by Professor Matthew Fletcher, Indian tribes are desperately 
in need of raising governmental revenues by different means since they do 
not have any kind of substantial tax base.92 
B. Silence as Equivocal: The 6th Circuit “Montana Framework” Approach. 
1. Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB.93 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, the Soaring Eagle 
court adopted what could be termed a “Montana framework” analysis as the 
governing methodology for determining if application of federal regulatory 
laws to a reservation-based tribally owned enterprise would infringe on 
tribal sovereignty.94 After acknowledging that it was bound by a previous 
                                                                                                     
 89. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comm’n,134 S. Ct 2024, 2038 (2014) (quoting 
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756 (1998)). 
 90. Id. (citing to C&L Enter. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indians, 121 S. Ct. 1589 
(2001)).  
 91. Id. at 2038 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 U.S. at 758).  
 92. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development 
as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004). 
 93. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 94. At least one scholar had previously recommended such an approach. See generally 
Kaighn Smith Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
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6th Circuit decision which had adopted the Coeur d’Alene “purely 
intramural aspect,”95 approach, the panel stated that it disagreed with that 
approach and proceeded on explaining “the approach that we believe is 
most consistent with Supreme Court precedent.”96  
The Soaring Eagle court took the position that the question to be 
answered in such cases was “whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign 
authority necessary to prevent application of a federal statute to tribal 
activity.”97 After noting that the tribal casino employed many people who 
were not tribal members, the court focused on whether the tribe had 
retained sovereign powers to regulate these non-members. The extent of 
tribal sovereign powers over non-members is determined by using an 
analysis first delineated in Montana v. United States.98 After first stating 
that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation,”99 the Montana court came up with a general rule 
that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”100 However, the Court immediately 
identified two exceptions to this general rule: 
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, 
even on no-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, 
licensing or other means the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealings, contracts, leases or other arrangements. A tribe 
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.101 
After giving a comprehensive description of how this Montana 
framework analysis should proceed when it comes to determining if a 
                                                                                                     
505 (2008). 
 95. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort, 791 F.3d at 662, (citing to NLRB v. Little River 
Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 666.  
 98. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).  
 99. Id. at 564.  
 100. Id. at 565.  
 101. Id. at 565–66. 
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federal law of general applicability should apply to Indian nations,102 the 
Sixth Circuit applied it to the facts of this case and concluded “the first 
Montana exception concerning consensual commercial relationship 
between the Tribe and nonmembers should apply to these facts.”103 The 
court explained that the consensual relations exception recognizes that, as a 
sovereign, the tribe has the power to enter into contractual relations with 
non-members working on the reservations and to place conditions in such 
contracts. The court also summarized why under its “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis, the tribal casino no-solicitation policy and its 
termination of employees violating that policy fell under Montana’s first 
exception. First, the operation of the casino was an important vehicle for the 
exercise of sovereignty. Second, while employing many non-members, it 
was mostly managed by tribal members. Third, revenues from the casino 
constituted 90% of all tribal revenues and allowed the tribe to provide 
essential government services to its members.104 The court ended its 
explanation by reminding us that the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“the power and ability of a tribal government to raise revenues for its 
essential services is an important aspect of tribal sovereignty.”105  
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also contained a comprehensive discussion 
of why a previous Sixth Circuit panel, which could not be overturned by a 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Soaring Eagle Resort & Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 667 (6th Cir. 2015) 
If Congress has not so spoken, we would then determine if the generally 
applicable federal regulatory statute impinges on the Tribe's control over its own 
members and its own activities. If it has, the general regulatory statute will not 
apply against the Tribe as a sovereign. If we find that the generally applicable 
federal statute does not impinge on the Tribe's right to govern activities of its 
members . . . we would assume that, generally, “the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” 
And we would determine, then, whether the Tribe has demonstrated that one of 
the two Montana exceptions to the general rule . . . applies. When analyzing the 
exceptions, we would apply a totality of the circumstances analysis . . . If one of 
the exceptions applies, the generally applicable federal statute should not apply 
to tribal conduct.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 668.  
 105. See id.  
We believe that the weight of these factors supports our conclusion that the 
NLRA should not apply to the Casino. We consider relevant: (1) the fact that the 
Casino is on trust land and is considered a unit of the Tribe's government; (2) the 
importance of the Casino to tribal governance and its ability to provide member 
services; and (3) that Lewis (and other nonmembers) voluntarily entered into an 
employment relationship with the Tribe.  
(quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1981)). 
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subsequent panel in the same circuit, was wrong to adopt the Coeur d’Alene 
analysis and would have also been wrong to adopt the D.C. Circuit San 
Manuel methodology.106 On Coeur d’Alene, the court concluded with the 
following observation,  
Ultimately, we find that the Coeur d'Alene framework, and especially its 
description of its first exception, overly constrains tribal sovereignty, 
fails to respect the historic deference that the Supreme Court has given 
to considerations of tribal sovereignty in the absence of congressional 
intent to the contrary, and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court 
directives in Montana and Hicks.107  
Concerning the D.C. Circuit’s commercial/traditional dichotomy, the court 
stated that this “distinction distorts the crucial overlap between tribal 
commercial development and government activity that is at the heart of the 
federal policy of self-determination. Indeed, that distinction flies in the face 
of congressional pronouncements to the contrary in the IGRA.”108 The 
court also stated that the distinction between traditional and commercial 
governmental activities “ignores the fact that the Supreme Court famously 
rejected a similar distinction in connection with federal regulation of states, 
characterizing this distinction as unworkable.”109 The court there was 
referring to the adoption of the “traditional governmental functions” 
standard for determining state immunity from federal regulations in 
National League of Cities v. Usery.110 That standard was rejected a few 
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio which characterized such an approach 
as unsound and unworkable.111 
2. Criticisms of the Approach. 
a. Questioning the Relevancy and Understanding of Montana’s Consensual 
Relations Exception. 
Although this Article takes the position that the Soaring Eagle 
“Montana framework” approach is more legally coherent than the “purely 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 673–75 (referring to NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 
537 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 107. Soaring Eagle Resort & Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 674 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 675. 
 110. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840–52 (1976).  
 111. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537–47 (1985). 
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intramural aspect” or the “spectrum of sovereignty” approaches, this 
approach does contain some flaws. While it claims to evaluate whether 
Indian nations have enough sovereignty to preempt federal law, because the 
Montana case creates a general rule of no tribal jurisdiction over non-
members unless of the two Montana exceptions apply, the approach in 
effect creates a rebuttable presumption that Congress always intends a 
federal law to apply to Indian nations inside their reservations if such law 
has the potential to impact a substantial number of non-tribal members.  
The Soaring Eagle approach could also result in a conundrum if the 
consensual exception was found not available to establish tribal jurisdiction 
over non-members. Although there is no question that application of the 
federal law to tribal regulations of its own members would intrude on tribal 
sovereignty, the reality is that it would not be politically, and perhaps even 
legally, feasible to have the non-member workforce covered under the 
NLRA and be allowed to join a union while the tribal workforce would 
have to remain unorganized. The same thing would probably be true for just 
about any of the general federal laws regulating the workplace, whether it 
be the FLSA or OSHA. 
Another problem in relying on the Montana framework is that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in applying the Montana consensual 
exception is a work in progress. As of now, for instance, there are no 
Supreme Court precedents which actually extend application of the 
Montana general rule (no tribal jurisdiction over non-members) to 
consensual relations involving activities of non-Indians on Indian owned 
lands within Indian reservations. Nevada v. Hicks extended Montana to all 
lands within Indian reservations but the case involved a very peculiar 
situation, extension of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over state game 
wardens,112 and the claim of tribal jurisdiction was based on the self-
governance exception. Furthermore, the Court was hopelessly fractured 
over the importance land ownership status should have concerning the 
Montana exceptions.113 In addition, Justice Scalia in his Hicks plurality 
opinion went out of his way to first rule that the state did have jurisdiction 
to investigate the crime in question which had been committed off the 
reservation. Implicit in this finding was that the tribe had lost the right to 
                                                                                                     
 112. Nevanda v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001). 
 113. Three Justices took the position that land ownership played some role in the 
determination of tribal jurisdiction, three Justices took the position that land status was not a 
jurisdictional factor, and three Justices thought it was a very important factor. Finally, 
Justice Ginsburg took the position that Strate should be limited to cases involving assertion 
of tribal jurisdiction over state officers performing official duties on Indian reservations. 
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exclude these state game wardens as long as they were performing their 
official duties. Consistent with this statement, some lower courts as well as 
scholars have taken the position that the Montana rule should not even be 
applicable to lands over which the tribe has retained the treaty right to 
exclude.114 
The consensual relations exception first came into play at the Supreme 
Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors where a non-Indian plaintiff was suing a 
non-Indian corporation in tribal court over a fender bender type traffic 
accident that occurred on the reservation.115 One of the plaintiff’s 
arguments was that the tribal court had jurisdiction because the defendant 
had a contract with the tribe to perform some work on the reservation. The 
Court did not agree, stating that the highway accident at issue presented “no 
‘consensual relationship’ of the qualifying kind.”116 The Court concluded 
that the contract was irrelevant here because it was between the defendant 
and the tribe and not with the plaintiff. The Court also examined the cases 
Montana listed as supporting the consensual exception. One involved a 
dispute over a sale transaction between a tribal member and a non-Indian 
trader.117 The other three all dealt with tribal taxes on non-Indians 
conducting business on the reservation.118 
The consensual relations exception also came into play in Atkinson 
Trading Co. v. Shirley where the non-Indian hotel operator was challenging 
a hotel occupancy tax imposed by the Navajo Nation.119 Stating that 
“Montana’s consensual relationship exception requires that the tax or 
regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual 
relationship itself,”120 the Court concluded that a nonmember’s receipt of 
police, fire, and medical services from the tribe “does not create the 
requisite connection,”121 and neither did the fact that the nonmember had a 
federal license to be an “Indian trader” on the reservation. 
                                                                                                     
 114. Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over 
Nonmembers on Trust Lands, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming). 
 115. Strate v. A-1 Contrs., 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).  
 118. The tribal taxes involved were on non-Indians grazing cattle, conducting business, 
or buying cigarettes from Indian vendors.  
 119. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649 (2001). 
 120. Id. at 656. 
 121. Id. at 655.  
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Reliance on Montana’s consensual relations exception has also 
become more problematic because in its latest foray into the intricacies of 
the implicit divestiture doctrine, the Supreme Court seemed to have cast a 
doubt on the prevailing understanding of the exception.122 Thus, In Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch,123 the Supreme Court came up with 
a new twist in interpreting the consensual relations exception. The Court 
refused to apply the exception to allow tribal court jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit filed by tribal member against a non-Indian bank which alleged that 
the bank had discriminated against tribal members who wanted to purchase 
land located on the reservation but owned in fee by the bank. The tribal 
members alleged that the bank offered much more favorable terms to non-
Indians as it did to them. The Court first stated that Indian tribal courts lack 
jurisdiction in this case because “the Tribe lacks the civil authority to 
regulate the Bank’s sale of its fee land.”124  
Addressing Montana’s first exception, the Court stated that Montana 
only permits “tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation 
that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests.”125 Thus, the Court seemed to 
imply that a tribe can only regulate the activities or conduct of non-
members pursuant to the consensual relations exception, “to the extent 
necessary to protect tribal self-government and to control internal 
relations.”126 In this case, the Court found that the sale of non-Indian fee 
land could not be “justified by reference to the tribe’s sovereign 
interests,”127 because “fee land owned by nonmembers has already been 
removed from the tribe’s immediate control.”128 While tribes may not be 
able to order the sale of non-Indian fee land, the Supreme Court has held 
that tribes can zone non-member fee lands under certain circumstances.129 
So, it was not quite accurate for the Court to state that tribal sovereign 
interests can never be affected when non-Indian fee lands are involved 
                                                                                                     
 122. M. Gatsby Miller, Note, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1825 (2014).  
 123. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 
(2008).  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 333.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 336. 
 128. Id. at 330.  
 129. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408, 
431 (1989).  
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because tribes have no power to control non-member fee lands.130 Besides, 
as argued by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, while under the Court’s rationale, 
the tribal court could not have ordered the sale of the land to tribal 
members, nothing in the Court’s reasoning should have prevented it from 
holding that the tribal court could still assess financial damages based on 
the discrimination claim since this remedy did not involve the forced sale of 
nonmember fee land.131  
This latest twist concerning the limits of the consensual relations 
exception may be at play in the next Indian case to be decided by the 
Supreme Court since certiorari was recently granted to a case out of the 
Fifth Circuit, Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw. 132 In the 
case, Dollar General filed suit in federal court to enjoin John Doe, a 
member of the tribe, from adjudicating a tort claim against the corporation 
in tribal court. John Doe, a thirteen year boy, alleged that the manager of 
the Dollar General store had sexually molested him when he was working 
there as an unpaid intern pursuant to a tribal educational program.133 Dollar 
General was leasing the land where the store was located from the tribe and 
had agreed with the tribe to participate in the Tribal Youth Opportunity 
Program under which John Doe was placed as an intern in its store. The 
Fifth Circuit upheld tribal jurisdiction pursuant to the consensual relations 
exception. Although the court observed that the consensual relation did not 
have to be strictly commercial to qualify under the Montana exception, it 
concluded that the consensual relationship here was “unquestionably of a 
commercial nature.”134 The court also found that there was an obvious 
nexus to Dollar General’s participation in the tribal program since the 
wrong alleged to have been perpetrated by Dollar General was placing a 
                                                                                                     
 130. Unless the word “immediate” which qualified the word “control” was used to 
distinguish a tribe ordering a “sale” of non-Indian fee land from a tribe just “zoning” such 
lands. Thus, later in the opinion Justice Roberts did acknowledge that the tribe “may 
legitimately seek to protect its members from noxious use that threaten tribal welfare or 
security,” However, he judiciously omitted to comment on how the tribe could go about 
doing this. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 330, 336 
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manager who sexually assaulted John Doe in a store located on tribal 
land.135 Concerning the impact of Justice Roberts language in Plains 
Commerce, after first mentioning that it was only dicta, the court stated, 
“[w]e do not interpret Plains Commerce to require an additional showing 
that one specific relationship, in itself, intrude[s] on the internal relations of 
the tribe or threaten[s] self-rule.”136 The court also added that, in any case, 
“the ability to regulate the working conditions (particularly as pertains to 
health and safety) of tribe members employed on reservation land is plainly 
central to the tribe’s power of self-government.”137 
Since the Court decided Plains Commerce, no federal court of appeals 
has interpreted the case as modifying Montana’s consensual exception.138 
The upcoming Dollar General decision should, however, lead the Supreme 
Court to evaluate the normative justifications for the consensual relations 
exception to the Montana general rule since Dollar General will no doubt 
argue that unless the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember 
pursuant to a consensual relation is tied to tribal self-government, there are 
no normative justifications. It is true that the Montana court started its 
argument by stating that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is 
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes.”139 Following Dollar 
General’s reasoning, the consensual relations exception to the general rule 
of “no tribal jurisdiction” should therefore be either tied to tribal self-
government or internal relations.  
There are two principal arguments to rebut this position. First, it can be 
argued that when it created that exception, the Montana court itself 
implicitly acknowledged that tribal jurisdiction over disputes with a nexus 
to commercial consensual relations was indeed essential to tribal self-
government or part of internal relations. Secondly, one can argue that the 
requirement of a nexus between the consensual agreement and tribal 
jurisdiction is there because for some Justices, the principal normative 
                                                                                                     
 135. Dollar General also argued that its alleged negligence, the training and selection of 
the manager, did not take place on the reservation but the court refused to address the issue 
since it was not raised in either the tribal or federal district court. Id. at 173–74.  
 136. Id. at 175.  
 137. Id.  
 138. See, e.g., Dish Network Service v. Laducer, 725 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2013); Att’ys 
Process & Investigation Servs. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010); Water 
Wheel Camp v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). One federal district court did take 
the position advocated by the defendant in Dollar General, see Rolling Frito-Lay Sales L.P. 
v. Stover, CV 11-1361-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9555, at *14 (D. Ariz. 2012).  
 139. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).  
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argument against tribal jurisdiction over non-members is that they have not 
consented to tribal jurisdiction and such jurisdiction without consent runs 
against one of the basic foundations of the American political system which 
is the principle of “the consent of the governed.”140 Thus, in holding that 
Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, Justice 
Kennedy once stated, “[t]he retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a 
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians 
who consent to be tribal members.”141 However, while in the field of 
criminal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy took the position that consent may 
only be inferred through membership, it can be argued that in the civil 
context, the Montana court recognized that nonmembers with such 
consensual agreements have implicitly consented to tribal regulation tied to 
such contracts and agreements. 
b. A Better Implicit Divestiture Approach? 
In an earlier work, I had suggested that if one was going to determine 
applicability of a silent general federal law to Indian nations by reference to 
the implicit divestiture doctrine or, in other words, the amount of retained 
sovereignty still possessed by Indian nations, a possible approach would be 
to use the implicit divestiture doctrine as originally conceived and 
formulated by Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.142 
In Oliphant, the Court held that when it came to assertion of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-members, it was inconsistent with the status of Indian 
tribes to exercise inherent sovereign powers in a fashion that was in conflict 
with the overriding sovereign interest of the United States.143 The Oliphant 
Court determined that such tribal jurisdiction was in conflict with an 
overriding federal interest because  
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
the United States has manifested a . . . great solicitude that its citizens be 
protected by the United Sates from unwarranted intrusions on their 
personal liberty . . . . By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the 
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give their power to try 
                                                                                                     
 140. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J.) (“The 
Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the governed.”). 
 141. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).  
 142. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). For further 
discussion see Skibine, supra note 49, at 126–30 (1991). 
 143. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209. 
148 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123 (2016) 
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable 
to Congress.144  
Although the Court did not actually state specifically why tribal 
prosecutions could result in such unwarranted intrusions into personal 
liberty, it seems that the Court was concerned about the fact that under 
previous Supreme Court precedents, Indian tribes were not bound by the 
Constitution.145 Thus, if the tribes had criminal jurisdiction over non-
members, it was possible that they could decide to prosecute such non-
members without the full protections of the Bill of Rights.146  
Nowadays, although the Montana framework has supplanted the 
Oliphant methodology when it comes to determining tribal civil jurisdiction 
over non-members,147 it could also be argued that the Oliphant 
methodology can still be used if application of the Montana framework 
would be awkward or inappropriate. Because the issue here is to determine 
whether Congress intended the law to apply to Indian nations, taking into 
account the existence of an overriding national interest to have the law 
apply is definitely more appropriate than making this decision by reference 
to whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-members under the Montana 
framework as was done in the Soaring Eagle Casino case.148 Because the 
very concept of an “overriding” sovereign interest implies a balancing or 
                                                                                                     
 144. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. 
 145. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–85 (1896).  
 146. Thus, the Court mentioned that even though Congress was careful to extend basic 
criminal rights to all non-Indians being prosecuted in federal courts for crimes committed in 
Indian country, “under respondent’s theory, however, Indian tribes would have been free to 
try the same non-Indians without these careful proceedings.” Id. at 1022.  
 147. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 111–36 and accompanying text. When Justice Rehnquist first 
came up with his Oliphant test to implicitly divest Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-members, he never indicated that such test was limited to matters of criminal 
jurisdiction. It is only after the test was unsuccessfully invoked in 1980 in an effort to 
prevent Indian tribes from taxing non-members buying cigarettes on Indian reservations, that 
the Court radically altered the Oliphant test in Montana. Thus, in Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Court stated,  
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribe’s dependent 
status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of 
tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the 
National Government . . . In the present cases, we can see no overriding federal 
interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. 
447 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1980). 
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comparison with other interests, i.e. the tribal interests,149 I suggested that 
in determining whether there was an overriding federal interest to apply 
general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations inside Indian reservations, 
there should be a balancing between the federal interests in applying the 
law to Indian nations and the interest of those nations in being governed by 
their own tribal law.150 Furthermore, the importance of the federal interest 
should be determined by whether the application of the general law to 
Indian nations inside the reservations was necessary to achieve the purpose 
and implementation of the law outside the reservations. In other words, 
would a tribal exemption from the law inside the reservations have a 
substantial negative impact on the implementation of the law outside Indian 
reservations?151  
C. Silence as a Presumption of Non-Applicability. 
1. The Tenth Circuit “Intent to Preempt” Approach. 
Faced with the same issue as the D.C., Ninth, and Sixth Circuits, the 
Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,152 phrased the issue as 
follows: “the central question here is whether the Pueblo continues to 
exercise the same authority to enact right-to-work laws as do states and 
territories, or whether Congress in enacting §§ 8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the 
NLRA, intended to strip Indian tribal governments of this authority as a 
sovereign.”153 The tribal ordinance in this case was prohibiting employers 
and unions from entering into agreements requiring employees to belong to 
a union. The court also mentioned that the district court “took pains to point 
out, namely, that the general applicability of federal labor law is not at 
issue.”154 While this sentence may lead some to erroneously believe that the 
case did not involve the application of laws of general applicability to 
Indian tribes, the court was only citing to a sentence in the district court 
                                                                                                     
 149. The Oliphant Court just assumed, however, that the federal interest in protecting 
its citizens from unwarranted intrusion into their liberty was overriding without actually 
doing any balancing with the tribal interests at stake. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism 
and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. IND. L. REV. 391, 397–98 (2007–
2008). 
 150. Skibine, supra note 49, at 128.  
 151. Id. at 129. 
 152. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
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opinion which stated that the question was not whether the NLRA was 
applicable to a private employer doing business on an Indian reservation 
but whether the private employer was also bound by the laws of the 
Pueblo.155 
The court announced that its analysis would be guided by the 
following principle:  
The burden falls on the NLRB and the Union, as plaintiffs attacking the 
exercise of sovereign tribal power, “to show that it has been modified, 
conditioned or divested by Congressional action . . . ambiguities in 
federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with 
tribal notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging 
tribal independence.”156 
The court also reiterated that “a well-established canon of Indian law is that 
doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the 
Indians.”157 Perhaps more controversial, the court also asserted that, “[t]he 
canon applies to other statutes, even where they do not mention Indians at 
all.”158  
Having determined that the NLRB had the burden to demonstrate a 
congressional intent to preempt the exercise of tribal sovereign power, the 
court found that enactment of such right-to-work ordinance was part of the 
Pueblo’s sovereign powers because “[i]n addition to broad authority over 
intramural matters such as membership, tribes retain sovereign authority to 
regulate economic activity within their territory.”159 The court did mention 
that under Montana, the tribe was divested of some inherent sovereign 
powers over non-members, but it concluded that,  
These limiting precedents, however, are not applicable here, where the 
NLRB seeks a declaratory judgment prohibiting the application of the 
ordinance to all persons everywhere on the reservation, and where the 
only instance of regulation cited pertains to consensual commercial 
dealings between the Pueblo and its members on the one hand, and a 
lumber company operating on lands leased from the tribe on the 
other.160 
                                                                                                     
 155. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1351–52 (D.N.M. 1998). 
 156. Id. at 1190.  
 157. Id. at 1191.  
 158. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 
EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 159. Id. at 1192.  
 160. Id. at 1193. 
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In Part II.B. of its opinion, the court explained why the burden to show 
a congressional intent to preempt should be on the NLRB, and why the 
Indian canons of statutory construction were applicable to a statute that was 
silent concerning Indians. The court started by asserting that although 
Congress can divest tribal powers, divestiture was disfavored as a matter of 
national policy. The court also mentioned the existence of a trust 
relationship between the United States and the tribe as well as Supreme 
Court precedents that had cautioned that when tribal sovereignty was at 
stake “we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative 
intent.”161 The Court also referred to the principle that there is a 
presumption of non-preemption,162 although usually, this principle is 
applied only to federal preemption of state law. Finally, the court 
mentioned that finding preemption of tribal law in this case would 
contradict congressional policy as well as the policy of the executive 
branch, which is to encourage tribal self-government.163 Addressing the 
argument made by the NLRB that there were other canons such as the 
principle expresio unius est exclusion alterius, which could clarify the plain 
meaning of the law as favoring preemption, the court stated, “[i]n the 
context of Indian law, appeals to ‘plain language’ or ‘plain meaning’ must 
give way to canons of statutory construction peculiar to Indian law.”164 
The issue in Pueblo of San Juan really came down to interpreting 
congressional silence on whether the law should apply to Indian tribes 
inside their reservations. Does such silence create a presumption of 
applicability or not? The court resolved the question in favor of tribal 
sovereignty, stating that, “[s]ilence is not sufficient to establish 
congressional intent to strip Indian tribes of their retained inherent authority 
to govern their own territory. The correct presumption is that silence does 
not work a divestiture of tribal power.”165 Noting that the section of the law 
at stake here did not preempt the states from enacting such right-to-work 
laws but reaffirmed their existing authority, the court stated “Congress’ 
silence as to the tribes can therefore hardly be taken as an affirmative 
divestment of their existing general authority as sovereigns to control 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. at 1195 (quoting from Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)). 
 162. Id.  
 163. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Id. at 1196.  
 165. See id. at 1196 (“[T]he proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign 
power to tax remains intact.” (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 
n.14 (1982))). 
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economic activity.”166 The same attitude towards legislative silence was 
recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit in a decision examining whether what 
the court referred to as “legislative void” evidenced a congressional intent 
to divest the tribes of jurisdiction over their own members committing 
crimes outside Indian reservations.167 The Sixth Circuit concluded that in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bay Mills, “congressional silence 
in matters of tribal sovereignty is more aptly viewed as congressional 
deference to tribal sovereignty.”168  
2. Judge Murphy’s Dissent. 
Judge Murphy penned a lengthy dissent asserting that Congress can 
abrogate tribal sovereign rights by implication and espousing the Coeur 
d’Alene approach. He also accused the majority of disregarding the fact that 
previous Tenth Circuit opinions had explicitly adopted the Coeur d’Alene 
approach. However, a closer reading of the three cases cited by Judge 
Murphy reveals that these cases are not that clear on this issue. In Nero v. 
Cherokee Nation,169 after noting that a previous Tenth Circuit opinion had 
questioned the validity of the Tuscarora dictum after the Supreme Court 
decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,170 the Nero court only 
mentioned that other lower court had adopted the Coeur d’Alene 
approach.171 The court did conclude, however, that application of the 
federal statute in this case would interfere with purely internal matters of 
self-government.172 The second case mentioned by Judge Murphy, EEOC v. 
Cherokee Nation,173 only mentioned Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene in a 
footnote and only for the proposition that some of the principles enunciated 
in these cases were not applicable to a case like this one where treaty rights 
were being impacted.174 
                                                                                                     
 166. Part III of the court’s decision explains why the Tuscarora dictum, if applicable at 
all, should be limited to regulations of Indian property and should not be applied to tribal 
exercise of sovereign power. Id. at 1198.  
 167. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 862 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 168. Id. at 863. 
 169. Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989).  
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Judge Murphy also relied on Phillips Petroleum v. EPA,175 where the 
issue was the applicability of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) inside 
the Osage Indian reservation. Notably, Judge Murphy took the majority to 
task for only distinguishing that case based on the fact that in Phillips 
Petroleum, the Osage Nation did not object to application of the SDWA.176 
The reality is actually more complicated. The Phillips Petroleum court 
relied primarily on its finding that Congress specifically intended the law to 
apply to Indians. The court first noted that the definition section of the 
SDWA refers directly to Indian tribal organizations in defining 
municipality.177 After looking at the text of the statute the court analyzed 
the “context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which 
the words were employed,”178 in order to back its finding that the legislative 
history reflected the fact that, “[i]n adopting the SDWA, Congress 
expressly stated its concern that Indians should enjoy the benefits of clean 
water drinking, as should all Americans.”179 It is only to back up its 
conclusion that the court at last mentioned that application of the SDWA 
here was also consistent with the Tuscarora principle.180 It is true that the 
Phillips Petroleum court did not directly address whether application of the 
SDWA should be precluded because it generally interfered with the 
sovereignty of the Osage Nation. However, because the Osage Nation 
wanted the Act to apply, there was no one to make this argument on appeal. 
Judge Murphy’s criticisms aside, the Tenth Circuit has more recently 
reaffirmed the position first adopted in Pueblo of San Juan in Dobbs v. 
Anthem Blue Cross.181 The court stated, “In this circuit, respect for Indian 
sovereignty means that federal regulatory schemes do not apply to tribal 
                                                                                                     
 175. 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 176. 871 F.2d at 1203.  
 177.  803 F.2d at 554. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 555. The court backed its statement by quoting from a congressional 
committee report service which noted that there were existing government programs for 
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2010). 
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governments exercising their sovereign authority absent express 
congressional authorization.”182 After acknowledging that applying federal 
regulatory laws to Indian tribes could interfere with tribal sovereignty, the 
court stated, 
For this reason, ERISA would not apply to insurance plans purchased by 
tribes for employees primarily engaged in governmental functions 
unless Congress expressly or necessarily preempted Indian tribal 
sovereignty. Applying ERISA to such plans would prevent tribal 
governments from purchasing insurance plans for governmental 
employees in the same manner as other government entities, thus 
treating tribal governments as a kind of inferior sovereign. We do not 
assume Congress intended to infringe on Indian tribal sovereignty in this 
manner absent an express statement or strong evidence of congressional 
intent.183 
3. Concluding Comments on the Various Approaches Adopted in the 
Circuits. 
In conclusion, both the Ninth Circuit’s “purely intramural aspects” as 
well as the D.C. Circuit’s “spectrum of sovereignty” approaches consider 
silence as creating a presumption of applicability and refuse to require clear 
indication of congressional intent unless the application of the law to Indian 
nations would impose an undue interference on peculiar “aspects” of tribal 
sovereignty. While the Soaring Eagle “Montana framework” approach 
claims to just ask whether the Indian nations have enough sovereignty to 
preempt application of the general federal law, its practical impact is to 
impose a presumption that Congress always intends a federal law impacting 
non tribal members to be applicable to Indian nations even on Indian 
reservations. Unlike the first three approaches which ask either whether 
tribal sovereignty is being interfered with “enough” or whether the tribes 
have “enough” sovereignty to preempt federal law, the Tenth Circuit rightly 
assumes that most if not all applications of a comprehensive federal 
regulatory scheme to Indian nations will interfere with tribal sovereignty. 
Legislative silence concerning Indian nations in this area, therefore, creates 
a presumption that the law should not be applicable to Indian nations. The 
key question is not, therefore, whether the general federal laws unduly 
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expressly protected Indian tribes' sovereignty, we later recognized that a treaty was not a 
necessary prerequisite to exemption.”). 
 183. Id. at 1284. 
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interferes with tribal sovereign rights or whether the tribes have enough 
sovereignty to preempt federal law but whether Congress intended to 
preempt tribal sovereign rights when enacting these general federal laws. 
The answer to that question turns on the current assumptions and 
understandings concerning how clear Congress needs to be in order to 
interfere with tribal sovereignty. In the next Part, I explain why the 
methodology used in Pueblo of San Juan by the Tenth Circuit is more 
consistent with “practical reasoning” and better reasoned than the 
methodology used by the other circuits. 
III. Interpreting Silence Under Practical Reasoning. 
A. Practical Reasoning. 
As stated in the introduction, this article takes the position that 
resolving the ambiguity created by the lack of any reference to Indian tribes 
in some of the federal regulatory laws of general applicability should be 
resolved according to “practical reasoning”, a theory put forth by Professors 
Frickey and Eskridge.184 Philip Frickey once stated that under practical 
reasoning “the interpreter consults all potentially relevant sources of 
statutory meaning. These sources include statutory text, legislative 
expectations, statutory purposes, evolution of the statute over time, and 
coherence of the statute with the broader public law.”185 Frickey and 
Eskridge explained that their methodology could be visualized as a “funnel 
of abstraction.”186 In that funnel, the statutory interpreter starts with more 
concrete factors such as text, legal precedent, legislative history, and 
statutory purpose, before moving on to more abstract factors such as 
evolutive considerations, and reconciliation of the interpretation with 
current public norms. When it comes to interpreting statutes in federal 
Indian law, Professor Frickey’s practical reasoning approach begins with a 
“heightened concern for context,”187 followed by a “critical assessment of 
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 185. Frickey, supra note 32, at 1208. 
 186. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 25, at 353. 
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desire to avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial decision-
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traditions and preunderstanding, and fusion of horizons.”188 Frickey and 
Eskridge borrowed the term “fusion of horizons” from Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics for interpreting text.189 According to this 
theory, “[t]he historical text contains assumptions and ‘preunderstanding’ a 
‘horizon which is often quite different from the “horizon” of the later 
interpreter.’”190 Thus, interpretation should be viewed “as an effort to seek 
common ground between the two often distant horizons.”191  
Last but not least, as once put by Professor Frickey, “it is essential to 
note what practical reasoning in federal Indian law is not. It is not blind 
acceptance of the Indian position in a case. Indeed, an appreciation for 
context, a critical assessment of asserted preunderstandings, and a fusing of 
horizons may work against Indian advocates in some circumstances.”192 In 
the next sections, after first considering text, purpose and congressional 
intent, the so-called foundational theories of statutory interpretation, I move 
to more contextual considerations such as the traditional understanding of 
tribal sovereignty, before ending with evolutive considerations. 
B. Foundational Considerations: Text, Purpose, and Congressional Intent. 
In the case of statutes silent about Indians, Indian nations could be 
included if the statute contained specific text to the effect that, “This Act 
shall be applied to absolutely everyone, located anywhere within the 
territorial borders of the United States.” This can explain why reservation 
Indians are covered for most purposes under general federal tax laws.193 
                                                                                                     
making; an appreciation of the complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and 
deliberation; a tolerance of ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a 
skepticism of rigid dichotomies . . . One significant consequence of thinking 
about interpretation in this way is that statutes have a dynamic quality; they can 
mean different things over time and across contexts and interpreters. 
Id. at 1208. 
 188. Id. at 1231. 
 189. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 25, at 346 (citing to Hans-Georg Gadamer theory 
of philosophical hermeneutics).  
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 192. Frickey, supra note 32, at 1237. 
 193. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870); Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606 (1943) (explaining that revenue laws are 
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Inclusion can also be predicated on legislative history reflecting a 
congressional intent that tribes be covered by the legislation.194 Finally, 
inclusion could also arguably be derived from the structure or purpose of 
the statute in cases where, for instance, excluding Indian nations would 
either make key provisions of the law unenforceable or defeat the very 
purpose of the law. This could help explain the inclusion of reservation 
Indians for the purpose of federal criminal laws applicable to anyone within 
the United States.195 In most cases, however, such arguments will not be 
available or convincing in arguing for inclusion of Indian nations within 
general federal regulatory statutes. 
C. Contextual Considerations: Historical Assumptions and Understanding 
About Tribal Sovereignty and Statutes Abrogating that Sovereignty. 
The relevant “context” here is the place of Indian nations within the 
legal and political system of the United States as well as the exercise of 
tribal sovereign powers which may conflict with the requirements mandated 
in some of the general federal regulatory laws. “Context” for the purpose of 
practical reasoning can be both the historical context as well as the current 
one. So on one hand, one can look at the historical context concerning the 
position of Indian nations at the time the legislation was enacted. Under this 
analysis, one would analyze what the legislators thought about Indian 
nations at the time the statute was enacted. On the other, one should also 
look at the current political and legal context. Here, one would look at the 
current understanding of the place of Indian nations within our legal and 
political system. Because Professor Frickey once wrote that “practical 
reason asks the questions relevant to understanding and reconstructing the 
legal treatment of tribal Indians as they are situated today,”196 it would 
seem that while the historical context at time of passage is certainly not 
irrelevant, the current political and legal understanding of Indian nations as 
they are today is more important. 
It seems clear that the assumptions and understandings of legislators 
before 1870 was that Indian nations were outside the political system of the 
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United States and therefore congressional legislation did not include them 
unless they were specifically mentioned.197 That was because until 1871, 
the United States related with tribes mostly by signing treaties with them.198 
However, legislation enacted during the Allotment Era could arguably carry 
the opposite understanding since the purpose of the policy was to assimilate 
Indians into the mainstream of American society.199 However, the 
Allotment Era ended in the late 1920s. It seems that most of the federal 
regulatory acts at issue in this article can be described as labor legislation 
enacted in the wake of the New Deal. As such they are contemporaries to 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).200 The IRA put an end to the 
Allotment Era and endorsed a policy of government to government with 
Indian tribes.201 One of IRA’s principal policy was the revitalization of 
tribal governments.202 Thus, it can be assumed that the New Deal Congress 
was in favor of protecting and promoting tribal self-government. It is highly 
unlikely, therefore, that such Congress would have interfered with tribal 
sovereign rights in such an underhanded manner as imposing a federal 
regulatory regime preempting tribal power without so much as mentioning 
Indian nations in such legislation.  
Part of the historical “assumptions and understandings” concerning 
interpretation of statutes affecting the rights of Indian nations are the 
various canons of statutory interpretations that are peculiar to the field of 
federal Indian law.203 One of them is that treaties and statutes are to be 
                                                                                                     
 197. See generally Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 122–23 (1884) (holding that unlike 
others non-citizens born in the United States, such as African American slaves, the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution did not make Indians born on Indian reservations 
citizens).  
 198.  See Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 263 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 
(2012) (prohibiting the making of any further treaties with Indian nations). 
 199. The Allotment Era started around 1871, the year Congress enacted a law putting 
an end to treaty making with Indian tribes (16 Stat. 544, codified at 25 U.S.C. 71), but it 
went into full force with the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as 
the Dawes Act. The purpose of the Act was to break up the tribally owned land base by 
giving an 80 to 160-acre allotment to every member of the tribe and selling the remaining 
lands on the reservation to non-Indians through the Homestead Acts. For further analysis, 
see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (1995).  
 200. Also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984–88, codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 452–454 (2012).  
 201. For more background information on the IRA, see Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal 
Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 189 (2001). 
 202. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 79–84 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. 
eds., 2012).  
 203. See Frickey, supra note 32, at 1228 (“In practical reasoning, canons can serve a 
critical interpretive role. They constitute a shorthand method of identifying the relevant 
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liberally construed with ambiguous provisions construed to the Indians’ 
benefit.204 This canon was initially only applied to treaty interpretation but 
was later extended to statutes affecting or dealing with Indians.205 As 
mentioned above, the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of San Juan applied this 
Indian canon of statutory interpretation to a statute that was not enacted 
with Indians in mind, let alone enacted for their particular benefit.206 The 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the Indian canons could 
be applied beyond Indian-specific statutes because most cases involve with 
statute specifically enacted for the benefit of Indians or for the regulation of 
Indian affairs. Furthermore, in many cases, the Court avoids the issue 
altogether by not finding any ambiguity generating the use of the canons, 
when in fact ambiguity there was.207 In a thorough and comprehensive 
article, Professor Bryan Wildenthal made some convincing arguments why 
the Indian canons should apply to federal laws of general applicability.208 
Among other things, he noted that at least three Supreme Court cases, Iowa 
Mutual v. LaPlante,209 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,210 and United 
States v. Dion, 211 had applied such canons to laws of general applicability.  
The Court has many times endorsed the statement that the Indian 
canons were “rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United 
states and the Indians.”212 So perhaps, the more cogent argument against 
applying the Indian canons to general federal statutes is that if the reason 
for the canons is the existence of a trust relationship between the United 
States and the Indian nations, the canons should only be applied to statutes 
                                                                                                     
public law tradition.”). 
 204. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (pointing out 
that one of the canons of statutory interpretation of Indian law is that statutes are to be 
liberally construed in favor of Indians).  
 205. See Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (restating the 
deeply rooted principle that statutes should be construed liberally in favor of Indians).  
 206. For the opposite view see San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312 
(2007) (refusing to apply the Indian canons to federal statutes of general applicability).  
 207. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001) (interpreting 
IGRA as clearly allowing federal taxation of some tribal gaming over a forceful dissent by 
Justice O’Connor who would have applied the Indian canons).  
 208. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Laws, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of 
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413 (2007). 
 209. 480 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).  
 210. 455 U.S. 139, 149–52 (1982).  
 211. 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986). 
 212. Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); Montana v. 
Blackfeet Tribe 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).  
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enacted pursuant to that trust relationship. In other words, the canons 
should only be applicable to statutes enacted for the benefit of Indian tribes 
or concerning the regulation of Indian affairs. The mistake in this 
conclusion has its roots in an erroneous or simplistic understanding about 
the nature of the trust responsibility.  
As originally conceived by Chief Justice Marshall, the ultimate reason 
for the trust, and therefore the Indian canons, is not the protection of 
individual Indians as incompetent wards of the government.213 The reason 
for the trust is the protection of Indian nations as domestic dependent 
nations.214 Because the Indian canons are derived from the trust, the reason 
for their existence, therefore, is the protection of the right of these domestic 
dependent Indian nations to exercise their sovereign rights of self-
government. Thus, no one would argue that the Indian canons should be 
applicable to all general federal laws such as a general criminal statute 
being applied to individual Indians or to a statute with no implications for 
tribal self-government, such as for instance, a statute governing how anyone 
should go about doing business with the Defense Department. However, a 
general federal statute silently preempting the exercise of tribal sovereign 
rights is another matter. 
                                                                                                     
 213. This later understanding of the trust doctrine was introduced during the Allotment 
Era. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 
28, 45 (1913) (bringing up the question of whether the United States should treat Indians as 
wards).  
 214. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (examining the unique 
relationship between the United States government and Indian nations and noting that they 
are domestic dependent nations); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (noting that 
while every nation is somewhat dependent on the nations that surround it they are still 
separate communities). For an eloquent argument interpreting the jurisprudence of Chief 
Justice Marshall as using canons of statutory and treaty interpretation to protect tribal 
sovereignty within the structure of the United States Constitution see Philip P. Frickey, 
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in 
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 393–417 (1993). 
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D. Evolutive Considerations and Fusion of Horizons. 
1. Current Assumptions and Understanding Concerning Abrogation of 
Inherent Tribal Sovereignty. 
a. Current Congressional Policies. 
One could argue that the last piece of congressional legislation which 
abrogated some inherent powers possessed by Indian tribes was the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, since the Act mandated application of most of the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights to tribal governments.215 Since then, 
congressional legislation has either been supportive of tribal self-
government,216 or relaxed some previously imposed restrictions.217 Other 
acts confirmed,218 or even arguably expanded the sovereign powers of 
Indian Tribes.219 Some may argue that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(IGRA),220 restricted tribal authority by mandating that tribes enter into 
compacts with states before conducting casino-type gaming activities. 
However, in reality, a lot of gaming activities were already prohibited or 
severely restricted on Indian reservations pursuant to federal law.221 
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is absolutely nothing in the 
record of Congress or congressional history which indicates that if given 
                                                                                                     
 215. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012).  
 216. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 
88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (facilitating and encouraging tribal self-government); see also Tribal 
Self-Governance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (same); Indian Financing 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (same).  
 217. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, P.L. 111-211, Title II, 124 Stat 2261, 
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982) 
(allowing Indians to enter into agreements regarding the disposition of their mineral 
resources).  
 218. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (affirming tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians); 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (2012) (affirming Indians’ special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons); Violence Against Women Reauthorization 
Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 120 (providing, under certain conditions, tribes 
criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing crimes involving domestic violence).  
 219. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (establishing 
standards for foster care placement with the intention of not breaking up Indian families).  
 220. 25 U.S.C §§ 2701–2721 (2012). 
 221. See Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988: 
The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal Usurpation of Tribal 
Sovereignty?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 96 (2010) (pointing out that many Indians opposed IGRA 
because it would curtail control but in reality federal government already controlled these 
activities through other legislation). 
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the choice, Congress would overwhelmingly approve legislation amending 
these federal laws of general applicability to include Indian tribes, thereby 
abrogating or preempting tribal powers. In fact, if Congress felt strongly 
about including the tribes under these acts, it would have already amended 
these acts to preempt tribal power. The fact that, with a couple of minor 
exceptions,222 it has done nothing indicates that Congress is, at best, neutral 
on this issue. There have been some proposed amendments to grant Indian 
tribes the same kind of exemptions enjoyed by other governmental 
organizations but so far, the organized labor lobby has prevented enactment 
of any such amendments.223  
b. Supreme Court Precedents. 
A major criticism of the approaches adopted in all the circuits except 
for the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of San Juan is that they do not require clear 
indication of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign powers and in 
doing so ignore the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning 
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign rights. As stated in a recent 
Supreme Court decision: “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ 
that exercise inherent sovereign authority. As dependents, the tribes are 
subject to plenary control by Congress . . . and yet they remain separate 
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution. Thus, unless and until Congress 
acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority.”224 
Concerning abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suits, the 
Supreme Court continues to uphold the language in the landmark decision 
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,225 to the effect that “It is settled that a 
waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed.”226 That language was recently reaffirmed in Michigan v. Bay 
                                                                                                     
 222. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) 
(2012) (exempting only tribal agencies that conduct governmental functions); Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining and Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1), (7) (2012) 
(seeming to exempt all tribally operated institutions). 
 223. The latest effort is the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015, S. 248, which was 
reported out of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on September 10, 2015. S. REP. NO. 
114-140 (2015). For a description of other failed efforts see Guss, supra note 34, at 1651–
52. 
 224. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).  
 225. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that the sovereign 
immunity of the Pueblo from suit had not been abrogated in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968). 
 226. Id. at 59. 
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Mills,227 where the Court held that nothing in the IGRA expressly abrogated 
the tribe’s sovereign immunity for allegedly conducting gaming on non-
Indian lands.228 Therefore, the state of Michigan could not sue the tribe in 
the instant case.229 In explaining the normative reason why it adopted a 
position requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to divest tribes of 
sovereign immunity, the Court stated “[w]e ruled that way for a single, 
simple reason: because it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not ours, to 
determine whether and how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of 
sovereignty the tribes retain . . . rests in the hands of Congress.”230 
Requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal 
sovereign rights beyond sovereign immunity from suits was recognized in 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,231 where the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether a couple of federal statutes as well as national energy 
policies implicitly preempted the tribe’s ability to tax oil and gas producers 
operating pursuant to tribal leases on the reservation. The Court first 
remarked that the Tribe had the inherent power to impose its severance tax 
pursuant to either its power of self-government or its power to exclude.232 
After quoting language from an earlier case to the effect that “a proper 
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of 
Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear 
indications of legislative intent,”233 the Court stated that “petitioners can 
cite to no statute that specifically divests the Tribe of its power to impose 
the severance tax on their mining activities.”234 The Court concluded that 
because it could find no “clear indications” that Congress implicitly 
divested the tribe of its power to impose the tax, the Federal Government 
                                                                                                     
 227. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (“The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal 
immunity; and “[t]o abrogate such immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that 
purpose.”) (citing C&L Enter. v. Citizen Band, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)) (quoting Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).  
 228. Id. at 2032–33.  
 229. The Court held that IGRA abrogated the tribe’s immunity for gaming conducted 
illegally on Indian lands but the gaming here was not conducted on Indian lands as such 
lands are defined in IGRA.  
 230. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014) (emphasis 
added).  
 231. 455 U.S. 130 (1981).  
 232. See id. at 137, 144 (noting that the power to tax is a fundamental attribute of 
sovereignty). 
 233. Id. at 149 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)). 
 234. Id. at 151.  
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had not divested the Tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activities 
on its land.235 
Merrion was followed by Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 
where the petitioner insurance corporation argued that the grant of diversity 
jurisdiction to federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 overrode the federal 
policy requiring some lawsuits arising on lands arguably under tribal 
jurisdiction to be first filed in tribal courts.236 The Court disagreed, stating 
that it did not “read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction to have 
implemented such a significant intrusion on tribal sovereignty. . . . The 
diversity statute makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the legislative 
history suggests any intent to render inoperative the established federal 
policy promoting tribal self-government.”237  
In conclusion, current Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that 
clear indication of congressional intent is required before tribal sovereign 
rights are interfered it. This indicates that the Tenth Circuit approach as 
applied in Pueblo of San Juan is more consistent with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. In the next section I ask pragmatic questions in order to 
reconcile the decision to interpret legislative silence as not abrogating tribal 
sovereign rights with current public norms.  
2. Reconciliation of the Interpretation with Current Public Norms. 
a. Are There any Reasons to Privilege Specific “Treaty” Rights over Other 
Specific Tribal Rights? 
As mentioned earlier, the Coeur d’Alene court recognized a second 
exception to the Tuscarora general presumption of applicability when it 
stated that, “A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the 
issue of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if . . . the 
application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate rights guaranteed by 
                                                                                                     
 235. Id. at 152. The Court also commented that even if there was some “ambiguity on 
this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, ‘[a]mbiguities in federal law have been 
construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of sovereignty and 
with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.’” (quoting from White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980)). 
 236. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987).  
 237. Id. at 17. The Court also remarked that “The original statute did not manifest a 
congressional intent to limit tribal sovereignty . . . Congress has amended the diversity 
statute several times since the development of tribal judicial systems, but it has never 
expressed any intent to limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts.” Id. at 17–18.  
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treaties.’”238 In such treaty cases, the Ninth Circuit does require the same 
clear indication of congressional intent that the Tenth Circuit requires for 
abrogation of any sovereign right. In this section, I argue that there are no 
reasons to treat abrogation of tribal sovereign rights any differently than 
abrogation of specific treaty rights. In other words, both should demand 
clear indication of congressional intent. 
A year after the Coeur d’Alene decision, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether a general federal regulatory statute had abrogated a treaty right in 
United States v. Dion.239 The issue in Dion was whether the Eagle 
Protection Act (EPA) applied to reservation Indians so as to prohibit them 
from hunting eagles without complying with the EPA’s restrictions. The 
Court started its analysis with the observation that,  
All parties to this litigation agree that the treaty rights reserved by the 
Yankton included the exclusive right to hunt and fish on their land. As a 
general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on 
lands reserved to them, unless such rights were clearly relinquished by 
treaty or have been modified by Congress.240  
After recognizing that the Court’s cases for finding abrogation of Indian 
treaty rights had at times used different language, the Court announced that, 
“[w]hat is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the 
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights 
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”241 
In Dion, the Court found such clear evidence of congressional intent from 
the fact that the EPA allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits 
to Indians for the purpose of taking eagles for religious purposes.242 
                                                                                                     
 238. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (2005). For a recent 
use of the treaty exception to avoid applying a law of general applicability, see the NLRB 
opinion in Chickasaw Nation, holding that a treaty clause granting the Chickasaw Nation the 
right to be secure from all laws except those passed by Congress under its authority over 
Indian Affairs, required clear evidence of congressional intent before the NLRA could be 
applied to the tribe. 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 2015 WL 3526096 (2015). 
 239. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
 240. Id. at 737–38. 
 241. Id. at 739–40.  
 242. As stated by the Court,  
Congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt bald and golden 
eagles is certainly strongly suggested on the face of the Eagle Protection Act. 
The provision allowing taking of eagles under permit for the religious purposes 
of Indian tribes is difficult to explain except as a reflection of an understanding 
that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians, a recognition that 
such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a decision that that 
problem should be solved not by exempting Indians from the coverage of the 
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Since then, the question has been whether the Coeur d’Alene “treaty” 
exception as supplemented by Dion’s “clear evidence” test is applicable to 
all “rights” that can be implied from the creation of a reservation, or 
whether such special treatment is only applicable to the abrogation of a 
specific kind of treaty rights such as hunting rights. This Article takes the 
position that although the Supreme Court in Dion talked in terms of a 
“treaty” right to hunt, that was only because the Yankton Sioux reservation 
happened to have been set aside by treaty. In fact, its holding is applicable 
to all reservations, those set aside by treaties and those that are not.243 First, 
the Dion Court emphasized that “These [hunting] rights need not be 
expressly mentioned in the treaty.”244 Secondly, although the Court relied 
on the existence of a religious purpose exemption for Indians to find clear 
evidence that Congress actually considered the treaty right and decided to 
abrogate it, the legislative history the Court relied on emphasized the need 
for a religious purpose exemption for tribes such as the Hopi, Zuni, and 
several Pueblos in the Southwest, which in fact do not have treaties with the 
United States.245  
One circuit, the Eighth, has agreed with this position even though it 
has otherwise generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s intramural aspect 
approach. For instance, in EEOC v. Fond du Lac,246 where the issue was the 
applicability of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act to Indian 
tribes, the Eighth Circuit took the position that the Tuscarora general rule 
“does not apply when the interest sought to be affected is a specific right 
reserved to Indians. Specific Indian rights will not be deemed to have been 
abrogated or limited absent a ‘clear and plain’ congressional intent.”247 
After first specifying that “[a]lthough the specific Indian right involved 
usually is based upon a treaty, such rights may also be based upon statutes, 
executive agreements, and federal common law,”248 the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
statute, but by authorizing the Secretary to issue permits to Indians where 
appropriate. The legislative history of the statute supports that view. 
Id. at 740. 
 243. Reservations can also be set aside by Executive Order or by congressional 
legislation. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 190–93 (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., 2012).  
 244. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).  
 245. See id. at 741–42 (noting the religious significance of the bald eagle to many 
Indians).  
 246. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1983).  
 247. Id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
 248. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).  
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remarked that “[i]nherent in the tribe's quasi-sovereignty is the tribe's power 
to make their own substantive law in internal matters and to enforce that 
law in their own forums. Accordingly, the Band has the implicit right to 
self-governance.”249 The court took the position that because the Indian 
tribes’ implicit right of tribal self-governance could be such a “specific 
right,” whenever a general federal regulatory law interfered with tribal self-
government the law was not applicable to Indian tribes absent clear 
evidence of congressional intent to apply it. Although sounding different, 
Fond du Lac is not an outright rejection of the basic Coeur d’Alene 
approach.250 What is different about the case is that it seems to merge the 
treaty right with the intramural aspect exception and in doing so, allows 
“specific rights” to tribal self-government to be treated as if they were 
specific treaty rights under Coeur d’Alene. Thus, under Fond du Lac, 
interference with the specific right of tribal self-government, even if that 
right is not specifically mentioned in a treaty, would require clear indication 
of congressional intent before the general federal law could be applied to 
the tribe.  
Much of the debate concerning interpretation of the treaty right 
exception has centered on a related issue: whether a treaty reserving the 
reservation “for the exclusive use” of the tribe and its members is specific 
enough to come under the treaty exception. Such treaty right to “exclusive 
                                                                                                     
 249. Id. (citations omitted). 
 250. Thus, in holding that the ADEA was not applicable in this case, the Fond du Lac 
court emphasized that because it was a tribal member who was suing his own tribe for age 
discrimination under the ADEA “this dispute involves a strictly intramural matter.” Id. at 
249. In other words, the case would have come the same way using Coeur d’Alene’s “purely 
intramural” exception. The question left open in the Eighth Circuit after Fond du Lac, was 
what would have happened if the person bringing the law suit under the ADEA had not been 
a member of the tribe. That question was answered at least at a district court level within the 
Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Fortune Bay Resort Casino. 688 F.Supp.2d 858 (D. Minn. 2010). 
The Fortune Bay court acknowledged that under Fond du Lac “unless there is clear and 
plain congressional intent to the contrary, a statute that is silent about its applicability to 
tribes is presumed not to apply to tribes if the statute abrogates or limits ‘specific Indian 
rights.’” Id. at 867. However, the court concluded that it was “unclear in this case whether 
the NLRA affects rights specifically reserved to the Band.” Id. at 869. A reading of the 
opinion reveals that the district court relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s San Manuel 
opinion as demonstrating that “facts relating to a tribal enterprise's impact on interstate 
commerce, particularly where the tribal enterprise's activities involve significant numbers of 
non-Indians, are relevant to the consideration of whether the NLRA applies to the tribal 
enterprise.” Id. at 870. After observing that the tribal casino employed a substantial number 
of non-Indians and had a substantial non-Indian customer base, the court concluded, “It 
appears that Fortune Bay's ‘activities are commercial in nature—not governmental. 
Moreover, the operation of a casino . . . can hardly be described as vital to the tribes' ability 
to govern themselves or as an essential attribute of their sovereignty.’” Id.  
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use” explicitly recognizes the tribal right to exclude non-members but it 
also implicitly recognizes the lesser right to condition entry into the 
reservation by regulating all those who enter the reservation.251 The narrow 
“specific” right approach seems to have originated in United States v. 
Farris,252 the same case which gave birth to the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. 
After enunciating the treaty exception to the Tuscarora principle, the Farris 
court stated that “[t]his rule applies only to subjects specifically covered in 
treaties, such as hunting rights . . . To bring the special rule into play here, 
general treaty language such as that devoting land to a tribe's ‘exclusive 
use’ is not sufficient, although such language does suffice to oust state 
jurisdiction.”253  
The Ninth Circuit has continued to follow this approach. For instance, 
in Department of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission where the issue was the application of OSHA to a tribally 
owned enterprise,254 one of the issues was whether the tribal treaty rights 
required the government to come up with clear evidence of congressional 
intent to apply the law to the tribe. Because the treaty created the 
reservation for the exclusive use of the tribe and specified that “nor shall 
any white person be permitted to reside upon the same without the 
concurrent permission of the agent and superintendent,” the Occupational 
Safety and Health Commission concluded that the treaty “evidence an 
intent of the parties to exclude the white man from the reservation lands for 
any and all purposes except as therein enumerated.”255 Therefore the 
Commission concluded that the application of OSHA to the tribe would 
infringe on the tribe’s right to exclusive use. Relying on Farris, and another 
Ninth Circuit precedent,256 the Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating,  
                                                                                                     
 251. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (“Nonmembers 
who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. The 
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued 
presence, or on reservation conduct.”); see also Kaighn Smith, Tribal Self-Determination 
and Judicial Restraint, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 517–28 (2008) (discussing the authority 
of Indian tribes to condition the presence of nonmembers for personal gain). 
 252. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 253. Id. at 893.  
 254. See Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 
182, 183 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining whether OSHA infringed on treaty rights in the 
operation of a saw mill owned and operated by the tribe).  
 255. Id. at 184–85. 
 256. See Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 
1982) (applying federal tax laws to the tribe).  
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on the facts before us, we do not find the conflict between the Tribe's 
right of general exclusion and the limited entry necessary to enforce the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act to be sufficient to bar application of 
the Act to the Warm Springs mill. The conflict must be more direct to 
bar the enforcement of statutes of general applicability.257  
Perhaps not surprisingly, most circuits that have favored the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow definition of tribal sovereignty to purely intramural aspects 
have also adopted the restrictive “specific” right approach to the treaty 
exception. Thus in Smart v. State Farm, where the issue was application of 
ERISA to a healthcare center run by the Chippewa Tribe,258 the Seventh 
Circuit took the position that, “Simply because a treaty exists does not by 
necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability 
is not binding on an Indian Tribe.”259 After stating, “The critical issue is 
whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured 
by the treaty,”260 the court stated, “The treaties to which the Chippewa 
Tribe are signatory do not delineate specific rights . . . The Chippewa 
treaties simply convey land within the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Tribe.”261 More recently, the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle Casino v. 
NLRB,262 after acknowledging a split between the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits on one side and the Tenth on the other, recognized that the question 
                                                                                                     
 257. Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 182, 
186–87 (9th Cir. 1991). In a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its narrow 
specific right approach to the treaty exception and held that the treaty at issue in the case 
could not prevent the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act on the reservations 
because,  
Here, there is nothing in the Medicine Creek Treaty directly on point discussing 
employment or wages and hours. Moreover, the language regarding freeing all 
slaves is not so ambiguous that it could be construed to cover the payment of 
required wages. Therefore, the application of the overtime provisions of the 
FLSA to a retail business such as Baby Zack's does not impact the tribe's 
agreement that it would free all slaves.  
Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 435 (2009).  
 258. See Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 30 (7th Cir. 1989) (presenting the 
question of whether ERISA applies to a health center owned and operated by the Chippewa).  
 259. Id. at 934.  
 260. Id. at 935.  
 261. Id. at 935. Thus, the court concluded that there was not a “single specific treaty or 
statutory right that would be affected by application of ERISA.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has 
reaffirmed its “specific right” approach in a more recent case, Menominee Tribal Enterprises 
v. Solis, where it held that a OSHA was applicable to a tribal enterprise located on the 
reservation. 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 262. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).  
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was a close one,263 but nevertheless concluded that a treaty right to exclude 
was “insufficient to bar application of federal regulatory statutes of general 
applicability,”264 at least in the absence of a “direct conflict between a 
specific right or exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the 
statutory scheme.”265 
In a pre-Dion case decided two years after Farris, the Tenth Circuit in 
Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products,266 came up with a different take on the 
treaty exception and held that OSHA was not applicable to a tribally owned 
enterprise because the treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation provided that 
only designated federal officials could enter the Navajo reservation.267 
Because applying OSHA would have allowed federal employees to enter 
the reservation at will for the purpose of enforcing the statute,268 the court 
stated 
The Navajo Treaty recognizes the Indian sovereignty of the Navajos and 
their right of self-government . . . Application of OSHA to NFPI would 
constitute abrogation of Article II of the Navajo Treaty relating to the 
exclusion of non-Indians not authorized to enter upon the Navajo 
Reservation. Furthermore, it would dilute the principles of tribal 
sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty.269  
After asserting that, “Limitations on tribal self-government cannot be 
implied from a treaty or statute; they must be expressly stated or otherwise 
made clear from surrounding circumstances and legislative history,”270 the 
                                                                                                     
 263. See id. at 660–61 (discussing the different approaches by the circuits). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 692 F.2d 709, 710–11 (10th Cir. 1982).  
 267. Article II of the treaty, states as follows:  
[T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to 
do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the government, 
or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in 
discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this 
article.  
Treaty with the Navaho, 15 Stat. 667 (1868). 
 268. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 657 (a)(1) (2012)  
(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon 
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is 
authorized (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, 
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where 
work is performed by an employee of an employer. 
 269. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d 709, 712 (1982).  
 270. Id.  
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court took the position that the Supreme Court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe,271 had abrogated the Tuscarora principle.272 
The Tenth Circuit followed Navajo Forest Products in a post Dion case, 
EEOC v. Cherokee Nation,273 where the issue was application of the ADEA to 
the Cherokee Nation. Describing Navajo Forest Products as having also been 
based on the principle that application of OSHA “would dilute the principles of 
tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty,” the court 
concluded that the “the treaty-protected right of self-government” would also 
be affected here.274 As stated by the court, “The treaty's language clearly and 
unequivocally recognizes tribal self-government with only two express 
exceptions, neither of which is at issue in this case . . . Consequently, we hold 
that ADEA is not applicable because its enforcement would directly interfere 
with the Cherokee Nation's treaty-protected right of self-government.”275  
This kind of thinking was more recently reflected by Judge Helen White’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Soaring Eagle Casino case.276 Relying 
on the canons of Indian treaty interpretation,277 Judge White disagreed with 
                                                                                                     
 271.  455 U.S. 130 (1982). See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Merrion. 
 272. The court stated that  
Merrion, in our view, limits or, by implication, overrules Tuscarora, at least to 
the extent of the broad language relied upon by the Secretary contained in 
Tuscarora that “it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a 
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their 
property interests.”  
Donovan, 692 F.2d at 713.  
 273. 871 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the court will follow the reasoning 
in Navajo Forest Products). 
 274. Id. Article V of the Treaty of New Echota, December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, 
provides in part: 
The United States hereby covenant and agree . . . [to] secure to the Cherokee 
Nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect all such 
laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of the 
persons and property within their own country belonging to their people or such 
persons as have connected themselves with them; provided always that they 
shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States and such acts 
of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade intercourse with the 
Indians. 
(emphasis added). 
 275. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 938.  
 276. See Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 675–76 (6th Cir. 
2015) (White, J., concurring in part dissenting in part) (stating that the canons of 
interpretation require statutes to be interpreted in the light most favorable to Indians). 
 277. See id. at 656 (majority opinion)  
These canons include ‘(1) how the words of the treaty were understood by the 
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the majority and argued that a treaty clause reserving tribal land for the 
exclusive use of the tribe was precise enough to require clear indication of 
congressional intent before it can be considered abrogated.278 According to 
her, the tribal members who signed a treaty giving up a huge portion of 
their tribal territory “would not have understood their right to the exclusive 
use, ownership, and occupancy of their remaining land to be limited, non-
specific, or subject to regulation regarding the conditions the Tribe might 
impose on those it permitted to enter.”279  
In conclusion, the normative reasons for the Dion rule do not justify 
requiring more specificity among treaty rights. Nor do they justify treating 
abrogation of tribal sovereign rights not mentioned in treaties any different 
than the ones specifically mentioned in treaties. As explained above, the 
Indian canons of statutory construction are derived from the trust 
responsibility the United States has towards Indian nations.280 The 
protection of tribal sovereign rights is as, if not more, essential to the 
survival of Indian nations as domestic dependent nations than the protection 
of specific treaty rights.281 In the process of upholding a tribe’s inherent 
sovereignty to tax non-members, the Court once remarked that the fact that 
the reservation of a tribe “was established by Executive Order rather than 
by treaty does not affect our analysis; the Tribe’s sovereign power is not 
affected by the manner in which its reservation was created.”282 Similarly, 
the fact that a tribal sovereign right was not specifically reserved in a treaty 
should not affect the analysis when it comes to determining if a general 
federal regulatory law should be applied to the tribe. So, one can conclude 
                                                                                                     
Indians rather than their critical meaning should form the rule of 
construction . . . (2) The language used in treaties with the Indians shall never be 
construed to their prejudice . . . (3) Congress may abrogate Indian treaties but it 
must clearly express its intent to do so.’ 
(internal citations omitted). 
 278. Id. at 676 (White, J., concurring in part dissenting in part). 
 279. Id.  
 280. See supra notes 203–14 for further discussion. On the extent and evolution of the 
trust doctrine, see Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native American 
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495–523 (1994). 
 281. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Sovereignty: A New Trust 
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
109, 177 (1995) (“[A]ny treaties, statutes, and judicial opinions recognize the self-
governance of Indian nations as integral to sovereignty.”).  
 282. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 n.1 (1982). The Court has 
also stated in Arizona v. California that whether a reservation was created by treaty or 
Executive Order is irrelevant when it comes to whether the reservation possessed federally 
reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine. 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963). 
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that all “rights” possessed exclusively by Indian tribes that are implicit in 
the creation of an Indian reservation require “clear evidence” of 
Congressional intent under Dion before they are considered abrogated. 
Inherent sovereign tribal rights to govern the reservation are such rights and 
should come under the Dion principle. 
One of the reasons for requiring clear evidence of congressional intent 
before finding a congressional abrogation of treaty rights is that since 1903, 
the Court has taken the position that Congress has plenary power to 
abrogate such treaty rights.283 In return for granting such power, the judicial 
branch developed canons of treaty interpretation peculiar to the field of 
federal Indian law.284 Similarly, however, the Court has also continued to 
hold that Congress has almost “plenary” authority in regulating tribal 
activities within Indian reservations.285 The Court did not have to do this 
since, arguably, the only power Congress has today over Indian tribes under 
the Constitution is to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”286 In 
return for this grant of what some may call, an extra-constitutional 
power,287 the courts developed special canons of statutory construction 
peculiar to the field of federal Indian law.288 One of these canons is that in 
return for allowing Congress to terminate or abrogate inherent tribal 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–56 (1903) (noting that Congress 
has plenary authority over tribal relations). 
 284. See Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 424 
(1993). 
 285.  See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (“The central function 
of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the 
field of Indian affairs.”) For critical evaluations of congressional plenary power, see Nell 
Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Source, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 195, 199–228 (1984) (discussing the history and implications of the plenary power 
of Congress); and Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
31, 39–94 (1996) (same). 
 286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The power was at least implicitly recognized as early 
as Worcester v. Georgia, although at that time, Congress still used the war power, and the 
treaty power in addition to the Commerce Clause power. 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). For a 
comprehensive analysis about the original intent on the reach of the Indian commerce power, 
see generally Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 
(2015). 
 287. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115 (2002) (“It is simply that there is no acceptable, 
historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for the exercise of any federal 
authority over Indian tribes without their consent manifested through treaty.”). 
 288. See Frickey, supra note 284, at 424 (discussing the canons of interpretation). 
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sovereign powers at will, the Court will require clear evidence that 
Congress actually intended such termination.289 
b. Are There Legitimate Reasons to Treat Tribal Governmental Institutions 
Differently Than Similar State, County, or Municipal Institutions? 
An opinion by Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit which refused to 
apply the FLSA to a tribal law enforcement organization,290 represents a 
good example of a decision not inconsistent with practical reasoning. In 
adopting what could be called a “comity” approach, Judge Posner engaged 
in an innovating exercise of statutory interpretation. After remarking that 
even literalists “do not interpret statutes literally when doing so would 
produce a result senseless in the real world,”291 he concluded that a literal 
reading of the FLSA would create an absurd distinction between tribal 
police and all other law enforcement agencies. After acknowledging that 
the statutory silence concerning Indians created an ambiguity in the FLSA, 
Posner stated, “We cannot think of any reason other than oversight why 
Congress failed to extend the law enforcement exemptions to Indian 
police . . . more important no reason has been suggested to us.”292 After 
determining that the warden-policemen of the Tribal Great Lakes Fish and 
Wildlife Commission were exercising the kind of regulatory functions over 
both Indians and non-Indians that was part of the “inherent sovereignty” of 
the tribe,293 the court took the position that out of notions of comity the 
same exemptions available to state police departments should be extended 
to tribal ones.294 The court held that when it comes to the FLSA, “tribal 
employees exercising governmental functions that when exercised by 
employees of other governments are given special consideration by the Act 
are exempt.”295 
                                                                                                     
 289. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (finding that Congress 
must make it their clear intention to intrude on tribal sovereignty); see also supra notes 203–
14 and accompanying text for discussion.  
 290. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 
1993).  
 291. Id. at 494.  
 292. Id.  
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. at 495. 
 295. Id. At first reading, one could easily believe that Judge Posner was devising a new 
approach to determine the applicability of silent federal regulatory statutes to Indian tribes, 
an approach one could describe as the “comity” approach. However, Judge Posner did 
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It is noteworthy that this comity approach was recently endorsed by 
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs which voted in favor of reporting 
the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015 (TLSA).296 The TLSA would 
amend the National Labor Relations Act to make sure that tribes and 
tribally owned businesses are treated the same under the law as other 
governmental employers. The idea of comity was also recently used by 
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community.297 At issue in the case was whether Michigan could sue the 
tribe for allegedly opening an illegal gaming operation on tribal fee land 
located off the reservation. The tribe argued that it had sovereign immunity 
from such lawsuits. Joining the majority’s ruling in favor of the tribe, 
Justice Sotomayor added another reason for upholding tribal sovereign 
immunity: 
Principles of Comity strongly counsel in favor of continued recognition 
of tribal sovereign immunity, including for off-reservation commercial 
conduct . . . We have held that Tribes may not sue States in federal 
court, including for commercial conduct that chiefly impacts Indian 
reservations . . . As the principal dissent observes, “Comity is about one 
sovereign respecting the dignity of another.” This Court would hardy 
foster respect for the dignity of Tribes by allowing States to sue Tribes 
for commercial activity on State lands, while prohibiting Tribes from 
suing states for commercial activity on Indian lands.298  
The comity principle reflected in both Judge Posner and Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinions is consistent with an argument I have made 
elsewhere that Indian nations have been incorporated into the political and 
legal system of the United States as governmental entities under a third 
sphere of sovereignty.299 As such, there should be a presumption that Indian 
                                                                                                     
acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit in Smart v. State Farm had already adopted the Coeur 
d’Alene approach but distinguished the case by stating that the employees there “were 
engaged in routine activities of a commercial service character.” Id. In a later decision, Judge 
Posner further confirmed his understanding that the Coeur d’Alene approach was the law in 
the Seventh Circuit. See Menominee Tribal Enter. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that his previous decision in Great Lakes Fish Commission was based on Coeur 
d’Alene’s “intramural aspect” exception).  
 296. See S. Rep. No. 114-140, at 4 (2015) (amending the NLRA to include businesses 
owned and operated by Indians on Indian land). 
 297. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2041 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he question whether to confer sovereign immunity is not a 
matter of right but rather one of ‘comity.’).  
 298. Id. at 2041–42. 
 299. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law and the Inherent 
Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 77, 102–07 (2014).  
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nations are treated the same as other non-federal governmental entities 
existing within the United States. 
IV. Conclusion  
For unknown reasons, in enacting many general federal regulatory 
laws, Congress by its silence failed to indicate whether the activities of 
Indian nations inside their own reservations should be covered under such 
legislation. In deciding whether such laws should include Indian nations, 
most courts have used an unjustified presumption to include them but have 
made exceptions when application of the law inside Indian reservations 
would interfere with certain aspects of tribal sovereignty or “specific” tribal 
treaty rights. After criticizing the various approaches developed in the 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, this Article has advocated using 
practical reasoning as a theory of statutory interpretation in order to 
determine whether Indian nations should be covered under these general 
federal regulatory laws.  
In doing so, the Article addressed the question of statutory 
applicability not by asking how important are the tribal sovereign rights 
being interfered with but how specific or clear Congress has to be before an 
intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights can be found. In making such 
determinations, the Article also asked pragmatic questions and answered 
them by taking into consideration the status of Indian nations within our 
political, legal, and constitutional system. Thus, the Article has argued for 
clear indications of congressional intent before any tribal sovereign right is 
interfered with by a law of general applicability. Furthermore, when it 
comes to requiring clear indications of congressional intent, there are no 
reasons to distinguish between specific Indian treaty right and all other 
tribal sovereign rights inherent or implicit in the creation of Indian 
reservations. Finally, the Article argued that of all the circuits, the Tenth 
Circuit opinion in Pueblo of San Juan represents the more consistent 
approach with Practical Reasoning. The Article also endorsed what some 
have called a “comity” approach and concluded that when it comes to the 
implementation of many of these general federal regulatory laws, there is 
no reason to treat Indian nations differently than how other local 
governments are treated under those laws. 
